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Harold Saunders was born December 27, 1930 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to Marian 
Weihenmayer Saunders and Harold Manuel Saunders.  He grew up in Philadelphia and attended 
Germantown Academy, graduating in 1948.  He went to Princeton University and graduated Phi 
Beta Kappa with high honors in English and the American Civilization Program in 1952.  He 
earned his Ph.D. in American Studies at Yale in 1956.  That year, he entered military service in a 
program sponsored by the CIA and was eventually assigned to be a staff assistant to the deputy 
director for intelligence, Bob Amory.  After that, he moved to the National Security Council in 
the White House under President Kennedy, where he worked under the next two presidents until 
1974, when he moved to the state department, where he stayed until Reagan was elected in 1981. 
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Don Nicoll:   It is June 21st, 2001, this is Don Nicoll intervi wing Ambassador Harold Saunders 
at the Kettering Foundation Office, 444 North Capitol Street in Washington, D.C.  Ambassador 
Saunders, would you give us your full name and spell it, and tell us your date, place of birth, and 
the names of your parents. 
 
Amb. Harold Saunders:   Harold Henry Saunders, S-A-U-N-D-E-R-S, born December 27, 
1930, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  My mother’s name was Marian, M-A-R-I-A-N, 
Weihenmayer, W-E-I-H-E-N-M-A-Y-E-R, Saunders.  My father was Harold Manuel, M-A-N-U-
E-L, Saunders.  They were born in the 1890s and were married in 1928 in Philadelphia, so I was 
a child of the Depression. 
 
DN:   And you were brought up in Philadelphia. 
 
HS:    In Philadelphia, I went to a private boy’s school there, never figured out quite how my 
parents afforded that, because my father was out of work for a couple of years because of the 
Depression.  But I went to a school called Germantow  Academy to which my mother was 
attracted because it was headed by a Presbyterian elder, although it was a non-sectarian school, 
he was just a marvelous personality.  And I went there from first grade through twelfth grade, 
graduated from there in 1948.  And my recollections f the war years of course, therefore, were 
as a young teenager.  I went to Princeton University and graduated there, Phi Beta Kappa with 
high honors in English and the American Civilization Program in 1952 and went straight on to 
graduate school at Yale University in American Studies and received my Ph.D. there in 1956. 
 
And as was necessary in those days, since I was twenty-five and a half when I got my degree and 
had been deferred by the draft board up until that point, I entered military service later in 1956 in 
a program sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency through its Junior Officer Trainee 
Program in collaboration with the Air Force.  What that meant was that I went for six months of 
Air Force basic training and then the Air Force waived its normal requirement for entry into 
Officer Candidate School, that normal requirement being four years of enlisted service before 
coming to OCS.  They waived that requirement so I went almost immediately from basic training 
into Officer Candidate School at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, and got my 
second lieutenant’s bars in June 1957, was stationed at Andrews Air Force Base and then 
detailed back to CIA to rejoin the Junior Officer Trainee Program. 
 
I served as my first job as staff assistant to the deputy director for intelligence, who was Bob 
Amory.  That’s the analytical portion of the agency.  Then I worked for a couple of years in the 
Office of Central Intelligence, and then was detaild to the National Security Council staff in the 
White House where I began serving in September 1961 under President Kennedy and McGeorge 
Bundy as national security advisor, and stayed on the NSC staff until July 1974, obviously 
working under three presidents and three NSC advisors.  By that time Kissinger had become 
Secretary of State, in ‘74, and in July I moved over to the State Department.  I was flying then on 
the Kissinger shuttles after the Arab-Israeli war of ‘73. 
 
Then I had three jobs in the State Department and left the government in 1981 because by that 
time I was Assistant Secretary of State appointed by President Carter.  Ronald Reagan didn’t 
want any Carter appointees around, no matter what their professional status.  So I left in January-
February of 1981, after having participated in the whole four hundred and forty-four days of the 
Iran hostage crisis.  I was at Camp David with Carter, Begin and Sadat. 
 
And since ‘81 I’ve had a career outside government engaging in what I call sustained dialogues 
with peoples in conflict, just as I did when I was in government but this time working with 
citizens outside government.  So that’s sort of an outline of my career. 
 
Of course I was in the State Department as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and 
South Asian affairs when Edmund Muskie became Secretary of State.  I had the privilege of 
working with him in a period that was of course totally dominated in my arena by the Iran 
hostage crisis and by the under currents of the, of what parts of the Arab-Israeli peace process 
could be alive during a presidential campaign and given the hostage crisis. 
 
DN:   You couldn’t have asked for a more intense assignment. 
 
HS:    I frequently say today that I was richly blessed by the things that I was privileged to be 
part of.  They were formative experiences both professionally and personally.  And I’ve been 
perhaps equally blessed in my time out of government by what I’ve been able to be involved in, 
what I’ve learned and that stuff. 
 
I might just add one more personal note because it does have an effect on the way I look at 
things.  My first wife died the day before the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 broke out.  So I flew in 
Mr. Kissinger’s shuttles and my own, doing my own process of mourning.  But I, perhaps the 
event and that series of experiences that captures most what that meant to me professionally was 
that the first time I saw Golda Meir after my wife died happened to be the day on which the 
casualty figures from the ‘73 war were announced in Israel.  And it was almost as if a, the 
proverbial biblical cloud was hanging over the country.  And she came over to me and took my 
hand and she said, “I’m terribly sorry about your loss, I lost a lot of people, too.  I guess we feel 
somewhat the same way.” 
 
What it meant to me was that if I ever forget as an American diplomat that I’m dealing with 
human beings in pain, I will not be doing my job.  So, it was that mixing of the personal 
mourning with the, at least some sensitization of the mourning that all the people I was dealing 
with were living through themselves that I think was extremely important to me because at the . . 
. .  It brought together the, whatever formal thinking one might do about international relations, 
that sort of state centered, realist paradigm, withall the things that you learn about human beings 
and how they interact.  And of course the Arab-Israeli conflict is essentially a human conflict, 
what I call a deep-rooted human conflict. 
 
And if I could bring this now to Ed Muskie, I . . . There were several people in my life of 
whom he was a very important one, even though for avery short time, where I had the privilege 
of working with a political person, because I think politicians, at their very best, have a 
remarkable capacity to blend the official formal and i formal personal.  And so when he was 
dealing with a prime minister of Israel, for instance, and I have a vignette in my mind.  I think 
one of the, I think his first exposure to, as Secretary of State, to somebody from the Arab-Israeli 
peace process was probably with the prime minister of Israel, Prime Minister [Yitzhak] Shamir, 
a relatively new figure on that scene.  But I saw him looking at this man as a fellow politician, 
not just as the Secretary of State. 
 
And I think it was Walt Rostow, who wrote when he left government in a preface to one of his 
books, that conversations between heads of state are different from conversations between 
foreign ministers.  A head of state will be thinking about his own political constraints, what he 
wants to do with the other political leader, what that political leader’s constraints are, and they 
will even talk about their constraints in what they can and cannot do, and what they can and 
cannot do with each other to accomplish objectives that are of interest to both.  Foreign ministers 
are much more likely to say, well now what’s the problem, what are our choices in dealing with 
it, and the choices will be perhaps somewhat more technically framed than would be those 
between heads of state. 
 
But Ed Muskie, of course, brought the instincts of the politician to the Secretary of State’s office 
and that’s, that immediately resonated with him.  I think the other political figure that I had 
worked with when I was on the NSC staff in the White House, Lyndon Johnson, was my first 
exposure to this melding of the maybe preeminent politician with the role of the head of 
government, head of state in dealing with some verydifficult things.  In that case the Arab-
Israeli war in 1967.  And relations between India and Pakistan.  But I saw him dealing with these 
figures and thinking about them as a political leader would, not as say Henry Kissinger would as 
a preeminent statesman, diplomat, if you will. 
 
DN:   A quick side question.  Was Secretary Vance more like the traditional diplomat, or did he 
blend in some of the political instincts as well? 
 
HS:    Cy Vance was very much the lawyer-diplomat in the best and fullest senses of both words; 
in my picture of the lawyers that I’ve dealt with in the United States and in other countries.  I 
developed a rather flip comment in my mind that some lawyers were bent on making problems 
and others were bent on solving problems.  And Cy Vance was clearly in the latter, and he was 
such a decent human being that the legal part of him was always subordinate to the personal 
judgment that came out of deep experience.  But the exp rience was essentially that of a 
diplomat or deputy secretary of defense. 
 
So he had, he was not a strategizer as Kissinger was, he was not a political person as Muskie 
was.  He was certainly not ignorant of the political dimensions of what he was doing, but that 
was not his fundamental instinct.  Where as Muskie was certainly not ignorant of the diplomatic 
requirements, but his fundamental instincts were those of the politician.  So you’re talking about 
mixes in a single personality. 
 
DN:   Your undergraduate and graduate studies focused on American Studies, and your 
professional career, beginning with your military assignment, led you into foreign policy.  Had 
you thought about foreign policy while you were a student, undergraduate and graduate school? 
 
HS:    Yes, I was fascinated as an undergraduate at Princeton by Woodrow Wilson, and 
particularly his taking American ideals into the world.  All the . . . “making the world safe for 
democracy,” all the things that we think about Wilson, and his failure.  I also, I took a course 
with a very fine diplomatic historian when I was in graduate school, and U.S. diplomatic history. 
 I later taught that as a, in an off-campus program at George Washington University, when I first 
came to Washington.  So I did think about that, but the connections between my study and the 
ultimate practice were subterranean in a very explicit sense. 
 
Two points: one, my academic programs were interdiscipl nary; the American civilization 
program while in the English department at Princeton and American Studies at Yale.  So I 
learned to see the world through the lenses of those different disciplines and realized that no one 
of them was adequate to deal with what I today call “whole human beings” and “whole bodies 
politic”.  The other was, the sense coming out of my graduate work, of a political process, of a 
process of continuous interaction in a whole body politic, people, institutions, institutions 
formal, as formal. 
 
And I say that because I believe that it was the group of us on the Kissinger shuttles in the first 
half of 1974 who coined the phrase now widely used in American English, “the peace process”.  
And we started out on those shuttles talking about a negotiating process, that is, building one 
interim disengagement agreement on top of another to create momentum toward a change in 
relationships.  And we realized that we were indeed ngaged in the larger change in relationships 
between bodies politic, Israel and hostile neighbors, and that the idea of a negotiating process 
was too narrow.  And we began using the phrase “peace process”.   And I, looking back today I 
wonder why I was so ready to accept the idea of a political process and then at some point I 
realized that that was rooted in the work I’d done  my doctoral dissertation.  And indeed when 
I wrote my most recent book titled A Public Peace Process, that is a peace process among 
citizens outside government.  I actually quoted a paragraph from my dissertation because, in the 
preface because it just showed some of the roots of my later experience. 
 
DN:   What was the title of your dissertation, by the way? 
 
HS:    It was called, “The Group Process in American Sociology and Political Science from 1880 
to 1930.”  It was a period when sociology and political science as academic disciplines were 
beginning to come into place in the new American university system and, uh, these people were 
trying to come to grips with a society that was urbanizing and industrializing with all kinds of 
consequences for the human beings caught up in all that. Whereas the American hero had been 
the freestanding individual, “I’m the master of my fate and the captain of my soul,” and those 
kinds of lofty words.  Theodore Dreiser and others were writing Sister Carrie and books about 
people being drowned, ground down under the weight of these social changes. 
 
So the people in the new so-called social sciences were struggling to figure out, if it isn’t the 
individual in the relation to the state that are thwo units of analysis in understanding a society, 
what are they?  They came from a variety of directions to focus on the small groups that people 
later called the sort of mediating structures betwen the individual and the larger society, 
everything from family to church to work groups, social groups, and so on.  And they came to 
the idea that, of a continuous process of interacting within the group and among groups as the 
way a society worked. 
 
DN:   Now your education had prepared you, and then Prime Minister - 
 
HS:    Golda Meir. 
 
DN:   Golda Meir had crystallized your view and how to internalize it, I gather. 
 
HS:    Exactly, yeah. 
 
DN:   And as you reflect on Senator Muskie, I want to pick up before I drop it the encounter with 
Prime Minister Shamir.  Did Secretary Muskie indicate that he and Shamir had met before? 
 
HS:    I won’t mislead any listener by saying yes or n, because I honestly can’t remember.  My 
impression is that he had not.  Shamir was not a major international figure.  I mean, he had been 
preceded by real giants among the Israeli prime ministers.  Golda herself, Rabin and people like 
that, Begin, so that he came mostly out of the Israeli political world and not a lot of people 
abroad knew him the way, so I suspect maybe the answer i  no. 
 
DN:   The reason I raise that is that in 1971 when Senator Muskie was engaged in the run up to 
the ‘72 campaign, we went to Israel among other countries, and while there spent an evening in 
Menachem Begin’s Tel Aviv apartment with Begin, Ezer Weizman and I think two or three of 
Begin’s colleagues dating back to the Irgun days.  And my impression is that Shamir was one of 
them and I wondered whether this came up. 
 
HS:    Well it could be.  No it did not.  Well to my knowledge it didn’t come up, but oftentimes 
in these meetings between a Secretary of State and a visiting of leader there would be moments 
of private conversation when nobody else happened to be around, and it could well have come 
up there. 
 
DN:   You might be interested that most of that evening was spent listening to a free debate of 
what who had done during the 1940s, particularly in co nection with the bombing of the King 
David Hotel.  They spent more time and energy on that t an in talking with Senator Muskie. 
 
HS:    That doesn’t surprise me.  I had my own almost daily reminders at certain times of that 
event, because we stayed on the sixth, when, during the shuttles with Kissinger, we stayed on the 
sixth floor of the Kind David Hotel.  And when he was ready to go down and get in the 
motorcade and go to the airport, go to the prime minister’s office or whatever, the Secret Service 
would block off the elevator.  So if you didn’t get down before that moment, you had to run 
down six flights of stairs at the end of the building where at a certain point you could see where 
the, whatever it was, the brick or whatever inside turn, change colors because that part was the 
new part that had to be replaced after the end of the building was blown off. 
 
DN:   When Senator Muskie became Secretary Muskie, it was a very difficult time I’m sure in 
the State Department with the clash between Secretary Vance and Mr. Brzezinski and now the 
transition.  How did Senator Muskie deal with you coming into the office and meeting one of the 
people who was critical to dealing with the Iran crisis? 
 
HS:    Well, the answer to that question, he dealt with me very straightforwardly as a 
professional, as a gentleman, and certainly there was no feeling of tension or cause for tension 
with him from my part.  I guess he sensed that and we never, I mean we just picked up where 
things needed to be picked up. 
 
I will say one other thing, though that I think is perhaps maybe the most, my most important 
feeling about Muskie in sort of brackets, my relationship with him.  I remember that the first big 
staff meeting that we had after he came in, and I’m going to paraphrase this and of course 
memory isn’t always entirely accurate.  But at one point he said in his introductory remarks, in a 
very straightforward way with no judgment intended whatsoever, nothing negative about Cy 
Vance, in his own, in a gentle way.  He said, “Just reporting, the president feels as distant from 
the State Department as from any other department of government, if not more so.  And he has 
asked me to, he has appointed me to try to bridge that gulf as well as to put a more public face.”  
Those are my words, not his, but put a more public face, more political face if you will, on the 
department vis-à-vis the Congress and the American people.  Implying in a way that, but not 
saying at all, that Vance’s approach had been that of the, of the professional who had not perhaps 
paid as much attention as might have been desirable to the public face of the department. 
 
But when he stopped, ended that presentation, I know that it was immediately, or fairly early.  I 
raised my hand and said, “Mr. Secretary, perhaps my experience here is somewhat different from 
that of many others around the table because I worked intimately with President Carter at Camp 
David.  And I worked intimately with him and his staff in the White House during the hostage 
crisis.  And I really have to raise a question about his feeling, not Senator, or Secretary’s 
Muskie’s reporting, but I have to raise a question about his feeling that way about the department 
because we have worked extremely well together.”  And I said, “I’m sure you will find here a 
building full of people who have the highest dedication to serving their president and their 
Secretary of State.  And I don’t think you’re going to feel the gulf that the president may feel, 
but I don’t think should feel.” 
 
And the other bracket to that was at a dinner in Georg town after we’d all left government, the 
hostages were home.  And, it wasn’t very long after w  left the government, sometime still in 
that late winter of ‘81.  I’m blocking on who had the dinner in his home, but we were, it was, the 
hostage team was all there, Christopher and Secretary Muskie.  And the thing that delighted me 
most was when he stood up and reminisced and talked bout how proud he was that we had 
brought fifty-two hostages home alive, that we had done this diplomatically, of course with the 
exception of the aborted rescue mission which was the proximate cause of his becoming 
Secretary of State, he didn’t refer to that.  But the thought that he was proud to have been part of 
the diplomatic effort, diplomatic at its least technical and most political, effort to bring people 
home alive by peaceful means meant an awful lot to me, because he came in with this notion that 
there was this gulf between the professionals and the political, and he left with the notion that we 
really had blended the two. 
 
DN:   Did you ever get a sense of whether his perception of President Carter’s attitude was an 
accurate one at that time? 
 
HS:    I’m not sure that it, that it was, but I do have this distorted perspective in that during the 
hostage crisis, which was the framework by that time, not the Arab-Israeli peace process so 
much, I was working very closely with Hamilton Jordan.  We worked, I guess this episode had 
pretty well played itself out by that time, but we had been working very closely with two Paris 
based human rights lawyers who were our intermediaries to Sadak Gobsadegh, the prime 
minister of Iran.  And so I had been in and out of Hamilton Jordan’s office and periodically he’d 
say, “Well let’s go down and talk to the boss about this.”  And Hamilton’s office was a couple 
doors away from the Oval Office and we’d just go down. 
 
And so when I started walking into the Oval Office with one of the Georgia colleagues, having 
been at Camp David, in and out of Carter’s cottage, nd so they certainly knew me well.  But 
that extra little endorsement of going in with Hamilton I think made us quite close.  And I just 
did not feel anything in Carter’s own response to the episode that made that a valid picture of the 
president’s views, which is in no way to say that Crter hadn’t said something like that to Ed 
Muskie. 
 
DN:   How differently Secretary Muskie deal with people at your level and the next levels down 
I would guess, from the way Secretary Vance did?  Was there much of a change in the style? 
 
HS:    I don’t think people in the building felt a great change in methods of operation.  I think 
you could pick later Secretaries of State who operated very, almost exclusively with a small 
coterie of people on the seventh floor around them, did not relate well to the rest of the building, 
but I think Muskie did.  I think the difference tha would be felt, which was not a matter of 
criticism of him, it was just a fact.  In Cy Vance you had somebody who had immersed himself 
in foreign affairs since his days in the Defense Department.  And when he became Secretary of 
State, we got on the plane with him and went to the Middle East within three or four weeks after 
the inauguration.  We didn’t even do a background briefing paper.  We did a paper on: here are 
your choices and here’s the way to move, ways of moving the peace process forward and here’s 
what you might try to do.  And so it was as if he’d been there right along. 
 
Ed Muskie, a) needed more of the background material but used it extremely well.  If you go 
back to that lunch with Shamir, I can remember being highly impressed with the way he handled 
sensitive issues, issues that would have been red flags for the prime minister of Israel.  He said 
what he wanted to say but he did it with the cautious wording of a superb politician/diplomat.  
So he didn’t need to be told much about these things, but he needed to be told perhaps more 
simply because that had not been his area or occupation.  So that was one slight change. 
 
And the other was that he also had to choose the problems that he was going to take a personal 
role in, a personal concern.  That happens in anybody’s, State Department; secretary will have 
these problems and delegate others to his deputy and to people down the line.  And the most 
immediate manifestation of that for me was that, I guess in agreement with Muskie, Carter pretty 
early on I think made it clear that Christopher should take the lead role and not dealing with the 
hostage crisis.  And of course that was by late August, early September it was almost codified in 
Carter’s designating Christopher to form a work group.  That’s when we had the first indication 
from the Iranians that they might be starting to think about how to resolve the hostage crisis, and 
we got a message from high level, got it through the Germans. 
 
At that point we had to formulate a position for the United States on how to resolve the crisis 
with the Iranians.  And he designated Christopher, y ah, Christopher to do that, which meant that 
whereas I had dealt daily, hourly with Vance on the hostage crisis, and he had dealt directly with 
the Iranian desk or country director, or head of the operations group.  There’s always a task force 
on a crisis in the State Department and Henry Peck was the head of that group, and Vance 
related easily to people in the task force. 
 
And Muskie would not have chosen to relate as directly, but it wasn’t because of standoffishness 
at all.  He had no hesitancy on the things that he was dealing with to relate directly to the task 
officers the way that Vance had.  It’s just that the configuration of people who related directly 
shifted because I think, I think by that time in the ostage crisis probably Carter, and maybe 
Muskie quite independently, judged that it had been a mistake for Carter to tie the presidency so 
closely to the hostage crisis.  It had been a, probably a political mistake, I mean politically in the 
sense of presidential elections, and possibly a mistake in dealing with the Iranians. 
 
Carter much earlier in the game, instead of saying, “I will not campaign in the primaries until the 
hostages have come home,” you know, so-called Rose Garden strategy.  If he hadn’t said that but 
had rather said, “I’m deeply concerned about the saf ty of our people, I want them home as 
quickly as possible, I will pay close attention to this.  But the day-to-day management of this will 
be handled by the Secretary of State or the Deputy Secretary of State.  They will convene a 
senior level work group which up until that time had been convened in the situation room in the 
White House.”  If he’d put it out, put it away from it him, it probably would have been better for 
the presidency. 
 
The psychologists told us later on that it would have been a lot better if the Iranians, the people 
holding the embassy, couldn’t have got their fingers on Carter so easily by his daily engagement, 
that he sort of walked away from them.  For all those reasons, and I think maybe Muskie 
recognized the maturing wisdom on that point, and even took himself out of the immediate 
management of that, so the management of the hostage crisis moved two steps away from the 
president.  And of course he came to office at a time when the very clearly White House 
directed, dominated decision to do the rescue mission had failed.  And of course Vance’s 
resignation came out of that. 
 
DN:   Had, how did the Secretary of State\National Security advisor relationship sort itself out in 
the transition from Vance to Muskie? 
 
HS:    I’d like to say a word about the night of the rescue mission right after it had failed, 
because it’s directly relevant to that point.  I think it’s probably not breaking a confidence at this 
point to say this, that Cy Vance was not a man who shows anger easily or often.  But that night I 
really saw him, heard him, there were three of us in his office at two o’clock in the morning after 
we sort of got away in the aftermath of the failure of the rescue mission.  And I saw him truly 
angry about Brzezinski, partly for the role in the decision to do the rescue mission, which Cy had 
objected to, but, because you know the decision was made when he was out of town. 
 
So there was that, but there was also the background f all kinds of other tensions between them. 
 And so that was clearly in the air, and I suspect, bu  I do not know, that Carter must have said 
something, certainly to Muskie about that and possibly Brzezinski.  I don’t know whether any of 
them mentions that in the memoirs.  I haven’t really sked myself that question.  But anyway, I 
think Muskie being the person he was came to office re ognizing that that relationship should 
have to be improved. 
 
The other thing was that I, I’m not sure in the short time that he had there that he had the time or 
the opportunity to stake out strong, personally held positions on the issues that had been at issue. 
 And those were principally in the field of U.S.-Soviet relations and of course the normalization 
with China.  Although Vance did not object to that, it was just that Brzezinski in particular 
moments had grabbed them away from the State Department.  So I, I think that the things that 
Muskie concentrated on may well not have opened the oor to the kind of confrontation that had 
evolved over the previous three years between Vance d Brzezinski.  Anyway, I think it abated 
to some significant degree at that point. 
 
DN:   And the president in essence had decided to rely on the State Department through Warren 
Christopher to manage the crisis in Iran. 
 
HS:    Yes, yes and certainly the period as I say after August, September when we had to put 
together an American position, we had to figure out how to put that to the Iranians, had to figure 
out how to accommodate the Iranians, etcetera.  All of that was in Christopher’s hands.  
Brzezinski had this, what do I want to call it, a private group, if you will, his own group that, 
with people from the Pentagon to design a military option.  And that had been going on since the 
beginning I guess of 1980.  You could even see it, it was no secret I don’t think.  But after 
meetings in the situation room of this general crisis group, Brzezinski would retire up to his 
office with a few people from the Pentagon and it was obvious they were planning a military 
option and I’m sure Cy knew about the existence of all that, it wasn’t done behind anybody’s 
back. 
 
But after the failure of the rescue mission, the military option was not on, and the diplomatic 
option picked up again.  They got together and of course political developments inside Iran 
unfolded to the point where the Iranians were ready to deal with us.  And I think again, Muskie 
had a, probably had a nose for the politics of what was going on.  It was on his watch that the 
political pieces came together in Iran in such a way as to lead to opportunities.  For instance 
when the speaker of the, when a speaker of the new Majlus, the new parliament in Iran was 
finally chosen, he sent a message to him.  And I think e understood why it was important to 
reach out in that very symbolic way.  So after a period of intense behind the scenes political—
slash—diplomatic activity, now was the time for political interaction, and I think he could smell 
that. 
 
DN:   We’ve talked about Iran.  One of the other major reas that you also alluded to was the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and you mentioned the visit w h Prime Minister Shamir.  What 
characterized Senator Muskie, or Secretary Muskie’s interactions with the leaders of Israel and 
the Arab world during that brief time that he was secretary? 
 
HS:    To be perfectly honest with you, I don’t have a clear memory of those interactions.  And I 
think it was, that’s probably true because there weren’t that many of them simply because the 
peace process itself was not at the level of intensity which we’d experienced at Camp David, 
after Camp David.  Let me just say that the pattern had been, in a presidential election year you 
do not expect to be intensively involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process.  For instance, the 
Kissinger shuttles, ‘74, ‘75, ‘76 was a year of a lot of activity in thought but no shuttles, yet 
everybody knew that the art of ‘76 was to keep things, keep connections alive, keep the talk 
going, but not put the U.S. on the line during that period. 
 
And the same was going to be true in 1980.  And the form that that took had been that Carter of 
course had been intensely involved through the completion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty 
in February, March 1979.  Already at the time you’re looking toward the election.  And I think 
Carter’s political advisors and Carter recognized at th t point that he’d have to step back.  In a 
way it’s a decision that should have been made, as I s id before, with regard to the hostage crisis. 
 But it was made, and it was made in the form of his appointing a Middle East negotiator in the 
person of Bob Strauss for the summer of 1979.  And I took several trips to the Middle East with 
Strauss.  The purpose of the Middle East negotiator was to take the next step envisioned by the 
Camp David Accords. 
 
Camp David Accords produced two frameworks, one of, first of which, a separate document, 
was a framework for peace between Egypt and Israel.  The treaty was concluded and 
implementation would proceed.  The other was that once that step had been taken, the 
Palestinian issue was to come to the fore and therewas to be a negotiation on creating a 
Palestinian authority in the West Bank of Gaza.  And that’s what Bob Strauss picked up, and his 
earliest trips to the Middle were for that purpose. 
 
But as you know, Strauss was pulled off of that in favor of Sol Linowitz in the fall because of 
Strauss’ potential contribution to the political campaign.  So the whole Middle Eastern Arab-
Israeli peace process just step by step moved into the background.  Now Sol Linowitz said at the 
end of 1980, and he tried to get this message across to Al Haig, the incoming Secretary of State 
under Reagan, that . . .  Sol, I think, used the figure eighty-five percent of the work on the 
Palestinian authority had been completed.  So Sol had been diligent through the election year, 
but in the same quiet way - 
 
End of Side A 
Side B 
 
DN:   This is the second side of the interview with Ambassador Saunders on June 21st, 2001.  
You were talking about Sol Linowitz and his quiet efforts in late 1980. 
 
HS:    Yes, the fact that they were quiet efforts and the fact that it was Sol Linowitz, the fact that 
he had a method of work, and a team to work with him, meant that again the Secretary of State 
did not have to involve himself in that the way Secretary Vance had during the Camp David 
period and the period of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.  Vance kicked off the beginnings of 
the post-Egypt-Israel peace treaty Palestinian phase, but uh, even he turned it over to, turned the 
work over to Bob Strauss and then later on to Linowitz.  But of course the hostage crisis 
dominated Vance’s attention so it was natural for Linowitz to go about his work without 
involving the Secretary of State.  So Ed Muskie inherited that mode of operation and that meant 
that he would not have to give primary attention to that.  You’ve already spoken to the fact that 
he turned the hostage crisis over to Christopher, so, uh. 
 
DN:   Did you have a chance to observe Secretary Muskie interacting with Bob Strauss and then 
Sol Linowitz? 
 
HS:    I don’t remember, I suppose we must have had some, you know, a few meetings together 
but I don’t remember any particular, I can’t bring up before my eyes some picture of any of those 
meetings.  Of course a lot of it we kept the secretary informed regularly by memo, and of course 
he kept on as his executive assistant Arnie Raphel w o had worked with Cy Vance.  Arnie had 
much earlier in his career been a staff assistant in the Near Eastern bureau when I first went there 
in ‘74.  So the relationships, the working together w e reasonable and we all communicated just 
via written notes or gave Arnie something to report ve bally.  So the secretary was kept well 
informed, but didn’t have to spend much of his time at it. 
 
DN:   What was the end of your time at the State Department, and the end of the Secretary 
Muskie time at the State Department like, as the new administration came in? 
 
HS:    Well I, I of course was by that time working very, almost completely on the hostage crisis, 
because in the fall of 1980, as I’ve already said, we had a message from the four key power 
centers in Iran through the Germans.  The four key power centers were (unintelligible word–
sounds like “Achmed”) Khomeini, the Ayatullah’s son, the new prime minister, the new speaker 
of the Majlus, and the new foreign minister.  And the message in effect said, and this came 
through the Germans, “The Amman is gravely ill and we think now is the time to resolve the 
hostage crisis.” 
 
We took a trip to Germany with Christopher, talked to the Germans about this, and to talk about 
some of the issues that were outstanding and . . .  Well, it turned out later that the Germans 
would not be the intermediary.  Somehow through a variety of channels we made it, uh, tried to 
find a way to ask the Iranians whom they would liketo have as the intermediary.  And the new 
foreign minister of Iran had been appointed and then almost immediately went to New York for 
the annual session of the U.N. General Assembly, where foreign ministers assemble.  The 
Algerian ambassador there had taken the new Iranian pr me minister, who had hardly been out of 
the country before, under his wing and acted as a mentor, a guide, and that was much 
appreciated.  So ultimately the word came back that the Iranians would like to work with the 
Algerians, so that’s what happened. 
 
But starting at the moment when we got that message, Kissinger, I mean, uh, Christopher under 
instructions from Carter formed a group, a working group, to lay out the American position.  
And it included a trans–, cross-governmental group f top, Carter’s own, the deputy secretary of 
the Treasury, and somebody in Justice Department, Defense, the legal advisor of state, somebody 
from the White House staff.  And all, out of the nine people I think seven were lawyers, and the 
two who were not were Arnie Raphel and myself, all for good reason.  The big issue was the fact 
that we’d frozen twelve billion dollars of Iranian ssets and if they were to be unfrozen, that had 
to be done in a way that would stand up under challenge in the American courts, so it was a 
major problem. 
 
In any case we, the Algerians were selected, the Alg rian team made three visits to the United 
States, we made three successive visits to Algeria.  Our position evolved through those, in those 
three steps through those three visits back and forth.  And meanwhile, the Algerians took our 
position to Iran three times.  And so my fall, to get back to your question, my fall was taken up 
by that work and the Algerian visits here, our visits to Algiers, and so I ended my government 
career as it turned out, the last few weeks of it being spent in the embassy in Algiers, with 
Christopher, working up terms of the final agreement. 
 
And then of course I think everybody’s familiar with the drama of inauguration day and what we 
were doing there and what Carter was doing in the Oval ffice, and so on.  Then I, Christopher 
came home but we all greeted the hostages in Algiers, and Christopher came back home and he 
left office.  I went to Reisbaden with the hostages and spent some time with them there, then 
came back independently.  While I was in Algiers the, t ree or four days before the, well maybe 
a little bit longer before the inauguration, I got a message from David Newsom who would be 
the acting Secretary of State through the transition.  He was then the undersecretary for political 
affairs, just saying that he’d been told that no Carter appointee should be in his office on January 
21st.  And so I communicated with the executive dirctor of my bureau who would have, be my 
link to the personnel system since I was not a career foreign service officer, that he sort of had to 
manage my, quote, retirement, unquote. 
 
But Newsom recognized that somebody needed to be around after January 20th, who could bring 
back to the department and ultimately testify befor congressional committees, on the agreement 
that was made with the Iranians on the release of the hostages, because that was going to have to 
be implemented in the next administration.  So he arranged to hire me back as a consultant.  But 
according to the laws you have to be a citizen outside government for three days, I think it was, 
before you could be hired as a consultant.  So I resign d, retired, whatever, the previous Friday 
and then inauguration day was on the Monday or Tuesday.  So for those three days, at the time of 
the signing of the agreement and everything else, I was a citizen outside government with no 
official responsibilities at all.  But that was the end of my government career.  Of course I spent 
those last two weeks in Algiers so I was not with Muskie in his departure from the department.  
I’m sure that David Newsom has been somebody that - 
 
DN:   Yes, I’ve interviewed him. 
 
HS:    You’ve interviewed him.  Well he’s told you much more intimately the Muskie side of all 
that.  So.  I think I ought to say one other thing, that there’s a part of my statement that Muskie 
was secretary during a period when the hostage crisis entered a more political than diplomatic 
phase.  My point goes back to a conversation in January 1980 between Cy Vance and a senior 
Islamic political figure named Sadac Ammahdi from the Sudan.  He was in Washington, talked 
with Vance.  Because we had made an effort to reach out to Islamic figures like that, to see 
whether there were those who would weigh in in Tehran on our behalf, with the argument that 
taking hostages is not a good Islamic thing to do. Anyway, this Islamic statesman told Vance 
very simply that, “You will not get your hostages back until Khomeini has put all the pieces of 
the Islamic revolution into place.” 
 
And there had already been a constitutional referendum, I guess, in December, this was January. 
 And following that there was a presidential election, then there were a couple of stages of 
elections to the new parliament.  And as the new parliament took its form, there were a number 
of, we would say, ‘challenges of credentials’ for elected people.  They would not use those 
words in Tehran but that’s about what they did.  They challenged people who were elected, on 
the basis of their credentials, for being seated in the Majlus.  This was part of assuring the 
predominance of the revolutionary party in the Majlus. 
 
But anyway, in the spring these events were unfolding, but then as I mentioned before, a speaker 
of the new Majlus was chosen, a prime minister was appointed, and of course confirmed by the 
Majlus.  A foreign minister came into being and was confirmed and so on.  And it was at that 
moment, after all this had been done, and I think the speaker of the house, somebody there, sent 
a congratulatory message to the new, we would call him speaker of the Majlus.  And I think, I 
can’t remember this exactly that Muskie said that either also send a message or send one to the 
new foreign minister, there were a couple of those kinds of exchanges.  All of that surrounded 
the initiation of this incredible first message that I mentioned earlier from these four figures in 
Tehran. 
 
And I didn’t say earlier that, in the message they said,  ”In addition to them we want to get this 
settled,” they said, “the Amman will be giving his speech in a few days and he will outline the 
four conditions for the release of the hostages.”  And indeed that did happen, which gave clear 
legitimacy to the message we’d received.  So, I just wanted to put the Muskie period in that very 
clear political scenario, that we had been advised to pay attention to. 
 
And of course actually, meanwhile we were doing diplomatic things with people in Europe and 
we enlisted, we went to see Kreisky, the chancellor of Austria, Bruno Kreisky.  And he went 
back and forth to Iran for his own reasons.  We talked to him about getting messages through.  
We talked to all the European governments about wheher in the post rescue mission phase, there 
could, new channels could be opened for a diplomatic resolution of this thing.  Of course, all that 
was devised and carried out on Muskie’s watch.  So again, he was involved in the new political 
chapter in dealing with the hostage crisis.  Although, and he was fully supportive of that and 
obviously blessed that it was reported to him.  So,but it won’t be in Warren Christopher’s 
context. 
 
DN:   Was the Islamic revolution complete, from your point of view, after that set of elections? 
 
HS:    Well I don’t think the revolution was complete at all, but the, the point that the Islamic 
Sudanese (unintelligible phrase), they were, and so Khomeini had the institutions f the Islamic 
revolution in place.  Now obviously the revolution, here we are in June . . .  
 
DN:    (Unintelligible phrase) 
 
HS:    . . . in the year of 2001 and it’s still going.  In one way or another it’s been going on ever 
since.  But I think institutionally the - 
 
DN:   You had all the pieces in place. 
 
HS:    The pieces were in place, and that seemed to be a fair prediction. 
 
DN:   I’m going to ask you some questions about post State Department period, but are there any 
other observations on your experience with Senator Muskie, Secretary Muskie which you 
wanted to make that we haven’t covered? 
 
HS:    I don’t think so, except for one thing.  And tha  is that, although the two principal things 
that I was spending time on were not at the top of his agenda the way they had been at the top of 
Secretary Vance’s agenda.  Through the contacts that we had, which I hardly even remember in 
any exact nature, we obviously developed a very nice relationship.  And I use that, there are 
some relationships that I’ve had with people like that, Jimmy Carter would be another, that they, 
there was a human dimension to it.  I think not goin  anything beyond the fact that we worked 
together, but there was a mutual respect and a warmth about the relationship, as well as the 
professional qualities that you would expect.  I would like to just put that on the record, that I 
came away feeling, despite the shortness of our working together, that he stands as one of the 
people that I respect for both the human and the professional, as well as the high political 
qualities of the person. 
 
DN:   Now after both of you had left the Department of State, I understand that he consulted 
with you from time to time, or sought your advice on a number of issues, particularly relating to 
Southeast Asia?  Or is that a misreport? 
 
HS:    Probably not Southeast— I think that’s a misrepo t.  I remember getting some specific 
questions, I think maybe in his post governmental role he was dealing with the . . .   Somehow I 
seem to remember some questions regarding relationships in the oil, in the oil business and a 
couple of other things like that.  But I just really don’t . . .  I obviously answered questions and 
maybe wrote him a memo or two, or something like that.  But there were no big and continuous 
operations of that kind. 
 
DN:   In the course of your experiences with Secretary Muskie, and thinking about your own 
perspective on building relationships between people and peoples, did you and he ever talk about 
his views on the political process and the question of civil discourse? 
 
HS:    No, I don’t remember any, any conversations of that kind.  I think it was in, these issues 
were implicit in the support that he gave to the political and diplomatic process in dealing with 
the Iran hostage crisis and the efforts in the Arab-Israeli peace process which were, had a very 
strong political dimension.  So I think the, the sen  of being easily on the same wave length in 
conducting a peace process rather than a diplomatic process, or a, an effort to resolve political 
problems with Iran, all of that, I think there was lmost an unspoken or implicit support for it.  
But I don’t remember any explicit conversations.  You don’t have a lot of philosophical 
discussions in the heat of battle, so to speak.  And it’s a rare moment when you step back and 
philosophize, and that’s highly regrettable but I think it’s probably true.  In any case, I don’t 
remember any, but I would have valued them. 
 
The other point is, I think, that I would really value such a conversation today, because a lot of 
what I’ve done since I left government has involved a conceptualization of the experiences that I 
had while I was in government.  I’m quite confident that I would not have written about or even 
thought about the things I was doing in quite, in the same way that I do now.  We did 
conceptualize the peace process; we did understand th t was a political process.  But even at 
that, when I wrote my book about the Arab-Israeli pace process in 1985, I conceptualized it in a 
far more, uh, what word to use, “mature” way than I would have when I was actually doing it.  I 
think I did reflect on what we were doing, I think I did use conceptualization as a way of 
explaining what we were doing to other diplomats, members of Congress and so on.  I found that 
a thoughtful way of imbuing what we were doing with a igher sense of purpose and strategy.  
So I did that, but I’d really value reflections today with an Ed Muskie, and I do with Jimmy 
Carter for instance, or with a Cy Vance.  But I, you, in the heat of battle - 
 
DN:   You don’t get that chance. 
 
HS:    Don’t get that chance, you don’t take the chance. 
 
DN:   Thank you very much (unintelligible phrase). 
 
HS:    Well thank you for the opportunity to.  It’s been a pleasure of going back to those days 
with you. 
 
DN:    Thank you. 
 
End of Interview 
